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Introduction 
 
  
“The school's teacher, Sara Mogammedovna, a stern but cheerful 42-year-old, has 
educated an entire generation of Samashki children…Standing outside her closed school - 
by order of the Russian command - she points at the bullet holes that scar the building. 
“At last count, I lost 100 of my children,” she says, adding that during the first war, when 
the Russians entered Samashki during ‘cleansing operations,’ they would walk by groups 
of children and shoot at them. “We don't teach children history,” she continues. “The 
children teach us. I sleep in the same bed with my ten-year-old. He says, ‘When I am 13 
or 14, just let me go and kill one Russian (di Giovanni  2000).’” 
 
What explains ethnic violence? More specifically, why do some factions claiming to 
represent an ethnic group engage in violence, while many others do not? To what extent do 
organizational attributes matter, as opposed to state attributes? Janine di Giovanni’s article “Evil 
Things Happened Here,” which provides a snapshot of the Chechen war and the treatment of the 
Chechen people by the Russian military, makes a compelling argument for seeing government 
repression and discrimination being the driving force behind the turn to violence (di Giovanni  
2000). The attacks had a significant impact on the nature of the Russian state and impacted and 
entrenched a repressive state effort toward dealing with violence in the Caucuses (Lynch 2005). 
Not surprisingly, much of the literature about Beslan is not focused on the politics of the attack 
but the traumatic impact on survivors (see for example Moscardino et al. 2007).  
Two of the key explanations offered for the attack at Beslan are revenge and 
ethnonationalism (see for example Ó Tuathail 2009). As Chivers reports, the terrorists at Beslan 
told their hostages, “We are from Chechnya,” and continued: “This is a seizure. We are here to 
start the withdrawal of troops and the liberation of Chechnya (Chivers 2007).”  Literature on 
ethnic conflict affirms the importance of repression and discrimination for the use of violence by 
ethnic groups (Gurr 2000, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).  
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What is missing, however, from much of the literature is an examination of why these 
groups, as opposed to other ethnopolitical organizations, use violence in the first place. The 
literature on political violence often focuses on state-level attributes (see for example Regan and 
Norton 2005). A number of scholars have begun to analyze organizational aspects of civil 
conflict (Cunningham 2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Pearlman and 
Cunningham 2012), but they focus on already-violent organizations, which limits our 
understanding of why certain organizations use violence while others do not.2 Ethnopolitical 
groups often engage in protests, lobbying, and other actions instead of violence. They seek to 
represent their community, sometimes provide social services, and engage in other non-violent 
activity. Indeed, of the hundreds of Eastern European ethnopolitical organizations analyzed in 
this article, fewer than 20% ever use violence. 
The current study intends to take a step back in the process and focus on which groups 
select violence, as other research takes such choices for granted.3  Other studies use the entire 
ethnic group as the unit of analysis (Gurr 2000; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). This does 
not allow one to address the question of why particular organizations use violence and others do 
not. Chechens did not attack Beslan, but a specific organization – the Riyadus-Salikhin group – 
did. By focusing on the organizational level and looking at both violent and nonviolent 
organizations, we are able to examine government repression and ethnonationalism in a more 
                                                 
2 For an important exception to this general limitation in the quantitative literature on nonstate 
actor political violence see, for example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). 
3 This is consistent with research that, instead of studying terrorist groups, sought to understand 
why some political parties became or created terrorist groups (Weinberg 1991). 
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precise and directed way. We can also see what other organizational factors are important in 
explaining why some groups use violence while others do not.  
To do this we turn to a new dataset called the Eastern European Minorities at Risk 
Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, which covers organizations that claim to represent 
ethnic or ethno-religious groups in Eastern Europe and Russia. The data provides yearly data on 
271 diverse organizations for a 15-year time period, and it includes organizations that are both 
violent and nonviolent. All the groups in the dataset are identified as organizations that claim to 
represent Minorities at Risk (MAR) groups as identified by Gurr (2000). The organizations must 
be politically active for at least three years and operate beyond the local level. The dataset 
excludes groups created by governments. It is important to note when making generalizations 
that the dataset is limited because it focuses specifically on the Eastern European area. However, 
it gives us the important advantage of being able to consider both violent and nonviolent 
organizations over time, and to examine a wide variety of possible factors that the literature has 
suggested might affect the use of violence. 
In the sections below we emphasize the importance of studying organizations, 
particularly the wider sample of both violence and nonviolent groups. Shortcomings in the civil 
conflict literature in particular are discussed. Using a focus on organizational resources, we 
present a number of related hypotheses for why a group might use violence. We then describe 
the data with more detail as well our methodology, and our then present our findings. The results 
suggest that group violence is associated with interorganizational competition, state repression 
and the group’s resources. Internal organizational factors such as leadership type are also 
associated with violence. Unpopular groups are more likely to use violence as well. Interestingly, 
whether the group provides social services is not associated with the use of violence.  
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What explains ethnic violence? 
 
 For decades, scholars have attempted to explain how political violence relates to ethnic 
identity and organization (e.g., Horowitz 1985). Two highly-cited articles suggest that there is no 
connection between ethnic grievances and civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). Neither study found a consistent relationship between a country’s ethnic 
diversity and propensity toward civil war onset, but they found onset related to economic factors. 
They interpreted this to mean that ethnic grievances are an insufficient condition for starting civil 
conflict, and material factors such as potential recruits, funding, and a weak government are 
necessary conditions for the opposition to engage in serious violence against the state. 
 The supposed lack of connection between ethnic factors and the start of civil conflict was 
surprising because the majority of civil wars have an ethnic component. For example, Sambanis 
(2001, 269) finds that of the 109 civil wars that started between 1960 and 1999, 77 were ethnic 
wars, while only 32 were revolutionary wars. Scholars have made a great deal of progress 
seeking to explain causal pathways between ethnic group dynamics and domestic violence. A 
number of studies have used the entire ethnic group (e.g., Hutus, Basques, etc.) as unit of 
analysis, most notably the work of Gurr and colleagues (Gurr and Moore 1997, Gurr 2000). 
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) also study ethnic groups, and show that the extent to which 
the group is represented in the government can explain political violence. 
 Using the country as the unit of analysis, many other studies have shown how ethnic 
issues contribute to violence, with some studies directly refuting the work of Fearon and Laitin 
and Collier and Hoeffler. For example, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) show that, upon further 
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analysis, there is often a relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset. 
Montalvo and Reynol-Querol (2005) find that ethnic polarization is robustly associated with the 
onset of civil war. Bhavnani and Miodownik (2009) find that the effect of polarization on civil 
war propensity is conditional on levels of ethnic salience. Blimes (2006) also finds an indirect 
relationship involving ethnicity, suggesting that, for example, a state’s total population size is 
only associated with its likelihood of civil war onset at higher levels of ethnic fractionalization. 
Government type can play a role in ethnic violence, as there are debates about how 
ethnofederalism or similar systems affect the likelihood of ethnic conflict (Bunce 2004, Roeder 
2009, Christin and Hug 2012).             
 The research thus far on ethnic dynamics and subnational violence, as noted in the 
introduction, is incomplete in a number of ways. First, the studies that use the state as the unit of 
analysis black-box many aspects of causal mechanisms. This broad unit of analysis can be 
problematic because it can overlook specific interactions with the state, such as whether 
repression actually targeted a group that later used violence. Second, the studies that analyze 
entire ethnic groups also leave questions unanswered. In many cases, some factions of an ethnic 
group engage in violence while others do not. Not every member of the ethnicity, and not every 
group claiming to represent the community, takes up arms. Finally, studies that focus only on 
civil war as an outcome truncate a great deal of political violence. By looking at lower levels of 
conflict, we contribute to understanding violence as a process, with many important causal 
factors along the way to what might eventually become a larger conflict. Given that the literature 
suffers from a deficiency of organizational explanations for political violence, and ethnic 
violence more specifically, the following section presents of number of relevant hypotheses.  
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Ethnopolitical organizations, resources, and violence 
 
 A premise underlying the hypotheses presented here is that organizational dynamics are 
fundamental for understanding political violence, including ethnic violence. This approach can 
be contrasted with frameworks emphasizing state regime type (Saideman et al. 2002), or elites 
(Kaufman 2006), for example. Given the focus on the organizational level, we further assume 
that subnational organizations’ quest for resources should be essential in explaining behavior of 
these groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Wilson 1973). The particular behavior we focus on in 
this article is violence, but of course the logic can be applied to other outcomes as well. As 
organizations seek to gather and retain resources – such as members and funds – they interact 
with other groups, and the state, and these interactions affect their ability to mobilize such 
resources. The resource pressures caused by these interactions should affect a group’s decision to 
use violence. Additionally, groups have a variety of potential sources for resources, and some 
should be especially likely to lead to the organizational decision to engage in violence. Finally, 
other group resources, or the way resources are deployed, such as controlling territory or 
providing social services, enable the group to use violence more effectively than other groups. 
 
Interorganizational competition 
In many contexts, multiple organizations claim to represent the same ethnic group. This 
often leads at least some of the organizations to take up violence. When multiple groups claim to 
represent the same ethnic population, these groups compete for finite resources, such as members 
and donations. This emphasis on groups’ efforts to gather necessary assets is consistent with 
studies of organizations and organizational survival (e.g., Wilson 1973). Organizational 
competition can lead to violence through at least two mechanisms:  First, a group, seeing another 
as a threat to its resource base, and therefore survival, might attempt to physically coerce the 
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other into disbanding or reducing its footprint. This suggests violence between the competing 
groups. Second, competition might encourage a group to employ violence as an innovation that 
can draw increased attention from the ethnic population. This suggests violence directed against 
the state or some other ethnic population, for example. Della Porta (2013) argues that 
“competitive escalation” often pushes political groups to violence, and she cites a number of 
examples from around the world. 
Other arguments in the literature suggest similar outcomes, regardless of whether a group 
is specifically ethnically motivated. Bloom’s (2004, 2005) “outbidding” argument suggests that 
interorganizational competition leads groups to adopt extreme tactics, such as suicide attacks, 
and shows evidence of this in diverse locations such as Israel and Sri Lanka. Beyond suicide 
attacks, a recent study finds that increased competition between terrorist groups leads to more 
shocking types of violence (Conrad and Greene 2015). Competition can also contribute to 
organizational endurance, as militant groups learn from each other and gain new incentives from 
their violent rivalry (Phillips 2015). Democratic competition, in terms of more interest groups, 
has also been shown to be associated with an increased possibility of violence (Chenoweth 
2010). Furthermore, research suggests that when an opposition movement is attempting to 
bargain with the government, if the movement is divided, it is more likely that a civil war breaks 
out (Cunningham 2013). The current study analyzes much lower levels of violence, but the logic 
is consistent. Overall, as organizations compete with each other, they should have a greater 
chance of using violence. 
H1: Organizations competing with other organizations are more likely to use violence 
than organizations not in competition. 
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While there is a solid theoretical basis for the above hypothesis, testing it is important 
because of mixed evidence in the literature regarding outbidding. Some studies find that group 
competition is not associated with violence (Findley and Young 2012), and other research only 
finds a relationship that is conditional on other factors (Nemeth 2014). Overall, additional 
empirical testing of the outbidding hypothesis is needed to determine if it finds support, and 
under what conditions – such as in particular regions. 
 
Repression  
A broad literature explores the consequences of state repression, with complex 
relationships shown to exist between state crackdowns and subnational mobilization or protest 
(e.g., Lichbach 1987, Opp and Roehl 1990, Inclan 2009). Regarding violence as an outcome, the 
literature is clearer: subnational violence is likely after the state represses (Lichbach 1987, Regan 
and Norton 2005, Francisco 2005). Why can state repression be counterproductive? In other 
words, why does it lead to an outcome that the state would prefer to avoid, violence by a 
subnational organization? An underlying assumption is that subnational political groups have a 
set of tactics available to them, their repertoire (Tilly 1978), and repression reduces the scope of 
activities available to these groups. This limitation in their choice of tactics shapes groups’ 
actions. Crackdowns on protest, paradoxically for repressive regimes, can give rise to substitute 
forms of expression such as violence (Francisco 2005). Groups unable to participate in legal 
politics do not have the same resources available to them as legal groups do, such as possibly 
access to government funds, or certain rights to media coverage. As a result, they are more likely 
turn to violence (Powell Jr 1982). This is consistent with research on terrorism, which suggests 
that hurdles to subnational groups’ legal political participation increase the likelihood of that 
type of violence (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Braithwaite, Foster, and Sobek 2012). 
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 Repression does not encourage subnational violence simply because it reduces the non-
violent options available to political groups. Karklins and Peterson (1993) found that harsh state 
reactions to subnational political groups in Eastern Europe during 1989 served as “focal events” 
for group members and sympathizers, emboldening them. Studying the same period in East 
Germany, Lohman (1994) argues that state over-reaction ignited an informational cascade, 
exposing a darker side of the state. This, too, could embolden groups to engage in violence. 
(Informational cascades are generally theorized to explain mobilization, not necessarily violence, 
but violence is a possible related outcome.)  Through these mechanisms, repression helps 
political groups mobilize resources and radicalize (Francisco 2005). Overall, when a state 
engages in repression toward a group, this should increase the likelihood that the group engages 
in violence. 
 H2: Organizations experiencing state repression are more likely to use violence than 
organizations not experiencing repression. 
 
Organization and mobilization dynamics: Leadership and popularity 
 Organizations differ greatly regarding internal dynamics. The structure of groups can 
vary from a hierarchical group with a powerful leader to a “horizontal” network-type group 
(Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001; Kilberg 2012). In the middle are groups such as those with a 
decentralized leadership, or groups led by councils. These differences have implications for 
political group behavior. On the one hand, network-structured groups are better at evading 
government repressive tactics and can be more resilient against leadership arrests. On the other 
hand, groups with stronger leaders can be more efficient. In general regarding organizational 
structure, dissident groups face a tradeoff between security and efficiency (Kilberg 2012). For 
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example, hierarchical subnational militant groups are more lethal than network-structure groups 
(Heger, Jung, and Wong 2012).  
 Beyond efficiency, centralized groups might be more likely to engage in violence 
because the organizational decision to use violence – which can be costly and backfire – can 
occur more quickly, without debate, in such a group. A strong leader, often charismatic in 
political organizations, should be better able to motivate a group to engage in violence. Once the 
decision is made to use violence, such a group type should be better equipped to carry out 
violence.4 In general, however, we believe that groups with strong leaders should be more likely 
to use violence.     
 H3: Organizations with strong leaders are more likely to use violence than organizations 
without strong leaders. 
 
 Ethnopolitical organizations are not only affected by their internal dynamics, but also 
their relationship with the wider ethnic community they claim to represent. Most ethnopolitical 
organizations do not use violence, so those that do are unusual – perhaps in their relationship 
with the state, perhaps in their relations with the broader community. If a group is considered on 
the “fringe,” without much popular support, it might turn to extreme means to draw more 
support, or just to achieve its goals without such support. One obvious type of extreme tactic that 
                                                 
4 Empirical evidence on this is somewhat mixed. For example, a study of Middle Eastern militant  
groups finds that groups with leadership deficits are more likely to use terrorism (Abrahms and 
Potter 2015). This is not directly comparable to the present study, which analyzes both violent 
and nonviolent groups, and looks at the outcome of general violence instead of terrorism. 
However, it is noteworthy that group leadership has various effects on the use of violence. 
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a fringe group could use is violence. In other words, the groups feel that they have “no other way 
out,” to use Lenin’s phrase, quoted notably by Goodwin (2001).   
 H4: Organizations that are less popular with the wider community are more likely to use 
violence than more popular organizations. 
 
Financial resources: Foreign state and diaspora support  
Violence can be costly. A subnational political organization should be more likely to 
engage in violence if it has means to pay the literal costs associated with physical conflict. The 
use of violence presents financial issues for subnational political groups in two ways:  First, 
violence can bring more direct costs, in terms of purchasing weapons and other tools to actually 
carry out the violence. Violence is costly to groups because of immediate expenses it entails, 
such as purchasing firearms or explosives. If a group is more grassroots and self-funded, it might 
prefer to stick to lower-cost non-violent political action, such as protest or petitions. However, if 
a group has a substantial source of income, it is likely to at least consider the possibility of 
adding higher-cost tactics to its repertoire, including violence. Note that this is not a study of 
large-scale violence such as civil war, where funding has been shown to be crucial. However, 
even lower levels of violence are costly (e.g., Giraldo and Trinkunas 2007), so there is still likely 
to be some role for funding ability in group violence. 
  Second, violence requires especially dedicated members, and a common way to keep 
members motivated is through financial incentives. Mobilizing support for any political activity 
has its costs (e.g., Lichbach 1995), but involvement in political violence brings high costs, 
including the potential for state sanctions and physical harm. To get members to participate in 
violence, or to stay in an organization involved in violence, a group should be especially able to 
offer incentives, selective benefits, to its members. There are a number of different types of 
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incentives a group can provide (Wilson 1973), but financial incentives are especially important. 
This is not to suggest that all members of ethnopolitical groups are simply working for 
paychecks, but that the group’s ability to provide financial incentives to members increases the 
likelihood of members’ continued participation.5  This is consistent with opportunity cost 
arguments for rebel recruitment in civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
We consider two types of revenue sources for subnational political groups – state support 
and diaspora support. These types of income flows, more than other sources, should be likely to 
be associated with violence because they come from outside the country in which the group 
primarily operates. This means there is less chance for the state or other domestic actors to 
sanction the funding source when the recipient group uses violence. Foreign state support has 
been shown to have important consequences for terrorist groups that receive it (Byman 2005; 
Carter 2012), as well as civil war participants (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Regan 2002). 
Similarly, research has shown that diaspora connections and support can help co-ethnic groups 
involved in crime (Williams 2001, Paoli and Reuter 2008), as well as groups involved in civil 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, the literature has not yet considered how either 
type of foreign assistance might affect other types of groups, such as subnational ethnopolitical 
groups. Based on the above arguments – that income sources make a group more likely to 
engage in violence, and foreign income should especially make violence probable – we propose 
the following hypotheses. 
                                                 
5 Ethnopolitical groups probably do not depend on monetary incentives as much as, for example, 
criminal organizations do, but there is nonetheless substantial evidence of financial incentives 
playing an important role for such subnational political organizations (Wilson 1973, Weinstein 
2006, Shapiro 2013). 
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H5: Organizations receiving foreign state support are more likely to use violence than 
organizations without foreign state support. 
H6: Organizations receiving diaspora support are more likely to use violence than 
organizations not receiving diaspora support. 
 
Note that there is an alternative possibility: that ethnopolitical groups are more likely to 
resort to violence when they lack funds. This assumes that funding helps groups to achieve 
change through legitimate and nonviolent means, and groups only take up arms out of financial 
desperation. This is consistent with research showing that violence, or at least terrorism, is used 
by weak or dysfunctional organizations (e.g., Abrahms and Potter 2015). The empirical tests will 
evaluate whether these two funding sources are associated with more violence, less violence, or 
not at all.  
 
Resources and their use: Territorial control and social service provision 
Control of territory is often a step in the direction of independence, and represents a 
challenge to a state’s legitimacy (Ford 2005, Mampilly 2007). Organizations that control 
territory are likely to be groups that are interested in breaking away from the state, and thus more 
likely to use violence against the state as a means to defend against state encroachment and as a 
tool to build towards independence. This clearly was the situation in the case of Chechnya 
(Lieven 1998). Control of territory is also a basis for resource extraction that would allow an 
organization to incentivize individuals to participate in violence (Collier et. al 2003, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004, Makarenko 2004). When an organization controls territory its capability to carry 
out attacks should go up dramatically because territory can “…accommodate entire training 
complexes, arms depots, and communications facilities (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 98).”  
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Indeed, Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) posit control of territory as one of the key factors 
that identifies an organization as an insurgent group. Thus we hypothesize that:  
H7: Organizations that control territory are more likely to use violence than organizations 
that do not control territory.  
 
Recently Berman and others have made a compelling case for the provision of social 
services as a useful tool for organizations that want to use violence as a political tool (Clark, 
2004; Flanigan, 2006; Berman, 2009; Szekely, 2014). Grynkewich (2008) points out that in some 
ways – like the control of territory – the provision of social services is a challenge to the state 
and an effort to replace the state. Berman goes further when he argues that when organizations 
provide social services – services like health, welfare and education related goods – the 
organization creates a situation where individuals become dependent on an organization for these 
goods, and this can buy their loyalty (Berman, 2009). Berman extends the logic of power that 
social services can provide an organization and suggests that this loyalty and dependence is a 
powerful force for recruiting people willing to engage in violence (Berman and Laitin 2008; 
Berman 2003, 2009). Berman argues that this explains the degree of violence achieved by groups 
as diverse as the Sicilian Mafia and Aum Shinrikyo. While the social services argument is 
compelling, it has mostly been tested within the context of the Middle East, and usually with a 
focus only on ex ante violent organizations.6 One of the advantages of our analysis is that we will 
be able to focus on violence within a different regional context than the Middle East to see if 
                                                 
6 An exception is Asal et al. (2013), who find a relationship between social service provision and 
organization violence by Middle Eastern ethnopolitical groups – examining the broad sample of 
nonviolent and violent groups. 
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social services have a similar effect in Eastern Europe and Russia as they appear to have in the 
Middle East. We hypothesize that:  
H8: Organizations that provide social services are more likely to use violence than 
organizations that do not provide such services.  
 
Data and methodology 
 To test our hypotheses we use the new Eastern European Minorities at Risk 
Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, which has information on organizations that claim 
to represent ethnic or ethno-religious groups in Eastern Europe and Russia.7  As noted 
previously, all the groups in the dataset are identified as groups that claim to represent MAR 
groups as identified by Gurr (2000). They need to be politically active for at least three years and 
operate beyond the local level. The dataset does not include organizations created by 
governments, and it also excludes umbrella organizations.  The dataset covers the years 1989-
2006, and has information on 271 organizations in 23 countries in the region under discussion. 
The data was collected from academic research and newspaper articles as well as reports by 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations. See Table 1 for a list of the countries 
included in the sample, and a list of all organizations in the dataset can be found in the appendix. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
  
                                                 
7 It is similar to the Middle East MAROB dataset. The MAROB codebook is available at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp. 
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 In this dataset, variables such as ideology are not coded as mutually exclusive. For 
example, an organization can be both nationalist and religious like the Chechen organization 
Ingush Jamaat.  This also means that organizations can use a mixture of strategies and thus 
organizations can use both violent and nonviolent strategies.  Similarly, the Communist Party of 
South Ossetia and the Democratic League of Kosovo used violence in the same year they ran for 
elections.  
 Due to missing data on some variables, the number of observations, and therefore groups, 
in models depends on the availability of data for those variables. The unit of analysis of the study 
is organization-year, and reported models have an n of as many as 2,384, although other models 
have fewer observations because of missing data. Models include 261 or 251 of the 277 groups. 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables in the models can be found in Table 2. A correlation 
matrix appears in the online appendix.8 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 The dependent variable is Violence, a dichotomous variable coded 1 during years which 
the group has used violence as a strategy. While an ordinal or even categorical variable would be 
helpful for a number of reasons, unfortunately at this point there is only this dichotomous 
measure of violence. About 7% of group-years are coded as times that the group under 
                                                 
8 The only variables with a correlation greater than .6 are territory and social services. However, 
if either of these is removed from the models, results do not change. For example, in Model 2, 
the primary model, territory remains statistically significant and positive when social services is 
excluded, and social services remains statistically insignificant when territory is excluded. As a 
result, it does not seem that multicollinearity is affecting results. 
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observation engaged in this behavior. Around 17% of groups, 47, are coded for violence during 
at least one year in the sample.9   
 For hypothesis 1, we use two distinct measures. Interorganizational competition is a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 for years in which the group being analyzed has any visible 
manifestation of conflict with another ethnopolitical group. This can include, for example, 
individual acts of harassment, political agitation, or communal rioting. About 7% of group-years 
are coded for this variable, but about 17% of groups are coded for such conflict during at least 
one year. It should be noted that groups are coded for this variable whether they are in 
competition with another group of their own ethnic community, or with group of a different 
ethnic community. This is not ideal, as the outbidding hypothesis is about the first type of 
competition. However, there are theoretical reasons for either type of competition to produce 
violence, as discussed above.  
 A second measure of group competition is Indirect competition (groups in country). This 
is simply a count of the number of groups in the data set in the country of the group being 
analyzed during the particular year. It is a rougher measure of competition, but several studies of 
outbidding use exactly this type of measure in their analysis (Findley and Young 2012, Young 
and Dugan 2014). This provides a comparable measure, although we think the 
Interorganizational competition measure is more precise. The measures apparently capture 
distinct dimensions of competition – direct and indirect – as they are virtually uncorrelated.10 
                                                 
9 To be clear, 7% refers to group-years, which is what is actually being analyzed in the 
quantitative study, while 17% refers to groups. Group descriptive data come from collapsing the 
data by group. 
10 The correlation is .13. 
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 Hypothesis 2 is tested with Repression. This variable is coded 1 for group-years in which 
the organization is illegal and subject to periodic or ongoing repression by the state. About 30% 
of organization-years are coded for repression, and almost half of groups are repressed at some 
point during the sample.  
 Hypothesis 3 is tested with Strong leader, a dichotomous variable indicating a group with 
a single powerful leader, as opposed to an organization with a council-style leadership or 
fragmented group. About 8% of group-years are coded as having a strong leader, and about 11% 
of groups are in such a situation in the data at some point. The next hypothesis is tested with 
Unpopular organization, a variable coded “1” for “fringe” groups that have minimal support 
from the ethnic community they claim to support. Groups coded zero might be one of several 
popular groups, or the single popular group representing the community. About 19% of group-
years and 30% of groups are considered to be unpopular at least one year.11 
 Hypothesis 5 is tested with Foreign state support, which is coded 1 for years in which a 
group receives support from a foreign government. About 8% of group-years are coded for this, 
but about 19% of all groups receive foreign state support at some point during the sample. We 
use Diaspora support to test hypothesis 6, and this variable is coded 1 for years in which a group 
                                                 
11 This variable is created using the MAROB variable Orgpop, which is an ordinal measure of 
organizational popularity where 1=fringle/unpopular groups, 2=one of several popular groups, 
and 3=the dominant group. Orgpop is missing data on several hundred group-years. To increase 
the size of the sample analyzed, we created a variable Orgpopconverted, where groups missing 
data on Orgpop are coded as being the lowest level of popularity, because we assume that if a 
group were more popular, this would be known. However, if a variable is used in the models that 
includes the missing group-years as missing, results are substantively the same.  
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receives aid from members of the minority group that have been internationally dispersed. Only 
about 3% of group-years are coded for this, and about 6% of groups receive diaspora support at 
least one year. Hypothesis 7 is tested with Territory, a binary variable indicating if the group 
administers territory, whether controlling movement in and out of the area, or actually providing 
governing structures. About 3% of group-years, and 7% of groups, are coded for this. To test 
hypothesis 8 we include Social services, which is an ordinal variable, 0-2, measuring the degree 
to which an organization provides services such as education, healthcare, or poverty alleviation 
to constituents. About 12% of groups are coded for some non-zero level of this variable at least 
one year.  
 The models include a number of control variables, to take into consideration other factors 
that could be associated with a group’s use of violence. The dichotomous variable Separatist is 
used, and groups are coded for this variable if their political motivations include a claim to 
national autonomy or independence. The choice of violence is often connected to the “…total 
rejection of the regime’s legitimacy” (Sprinzak 1991, 52) and the ideology of ethnonationalism 
for groups that are advocating for a separate state is fundamentally a rejection of the regime’s 
legitimacy. About 55% of all groups are coded as having such goals. We also include the 
measure Religious, a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the group advocates policies that 
incorporate religion into public life. Juergensmeyer  (2003) argues that religious ideology 
facilitiates the killing of opponents because it allows participants in conflict to see the other side 
 21 
as antagonists in a “cosmic war” where the enemy is evil. About 6% of groups are coded as 
religious.12  
 Models also include a number of state-level measures for the country in which the 
organization operates. Regime type should also affect groups’ likelihood of using violence. 
Organizations in democratic states have more opportunities to affect change non-violently, and 
therefore should avoid costly violence (Regan and Norton 2005, 333). State regime type is the 
Freedom House 1-3 measure, where 1 indicates “free” and 3 indicates “not free.” We include 
two country-level economic measures, State GDPPC (log) and State GDPPC growth. Both 
measures come from the World Bank World Development Indicators. All three state-level 
variables were obtained via the Quality of Government data (Teorell et al. 2013). 
 Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we use logistic regression for the 
analysis. Because organizations are measured multiple times (each year), standard errors are 
clustered by group (Woolridge 2003, Zorn 2006). Year dummies are included to address 
unmeasured temporal phenomena that might affect organizations, although they are not reported 
in the results for space reasons. The online appendix includes additional robustness checks, 
which are discussed below. 
[Table 3 about here.] 
Analysis and discussion  
 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, there are far fewer religious groups in the Eastern Europe sample than in the 
Middle Eastern MAROB data. In the Middle Eastern data, about 25% of groups are coded as 
having a religious motivation (Asal et al. 2013). 
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 Results are shown in Table 3, which includes two models. The first model includes only 
organization-level attributes, and the second also includes state measures. Interorganizational 
competition is statistically significant and positive in both models, suggesting that when an 
ethnopolitical group is in direct competition with another ethnopolitical group, it is more likely 
than groups not in competition to use violence. This suggests support for the first hypothesis. 
The other measure, Indirect competition (groups in country), is not as robustly related to 
violence. In the model with state attributes, it is only associated with violence at the p<.10 level. 
In robustness checks in the online appendix, results are at that significance level or statistically 
insignificant. This suggests an interesting nuance for the outbidding hypothesis: only direct 
competition is associated with a group’s use of violence. Indirect competition, measured as the 
number of groups in the country, is not consistently related to violence.  
Repression is also statistically significant and positively signed in both models, indicating 
that when a group is a target of government repression, it is more likely than other groups to use 
violence. This is consistent with the second hypothesis. With Repression, as with 
Interorganizational competition, there is a possibility of reverse causality. However, if either of 
these independent variables is temporally lagged, its results are basically the same.  
Strong leader is statistically significant and positively signed in both models as well, 
suggesting an ethnopolitical group with a single powerful leader is more likely to engage in 
violence than a group with another type of leadership structure. This supports the hypothesis. 
Unpopular group is also statistically significant and positively signed, consistent with 
expectations. Groups with little support from the broader ethnic community are more likely to 
use violence. 
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There is some support for the “financial resources” hypotheses. Foreign state support is 
marginally statistically significant (p<.10) in Model 1, without state attributes. It is possible this 
is due to omitted variable bias. It is statistically significant and positive in Model 2, consistent 
with the hypothesis, but this result does not hold in all of the robustness checks shown in the 
online appendix. Overall, there is some evidence for an association between an ethnopolitical 
group receiving foreign state support and using violence. Diaspora support is statistically 
significant. There is support for hypothesis 6.13 Overall, the results of these two variables suggest 
some support for a connection between foreign funding and a group’s propensity to use violence. 
The not-completely-robust results could be related to the fact, discussed in the theoretical 
section, that while funds are needed for substantial levels of organizational violence such as that 
seen in civil war, financial resources are less necessary for lower levels of violence. 
 Regarding hypothesis 7, Territory is consistently positively signed and statistically 
significant. There is support for the hypothesis.  Ethnopolitical organizations that control 
territory are more likely to engage in violence than groups that do not control territory.  
Interestingly, Social services is statistically insignificant in all models. This goes against 
expectations. This is interesting because of arguments by Berman (2003, 2009) and others that 
social service provision should aid organizations in becoming especially violent. This argument 
has generally been tested in the Middle East, where it has found support (Asal et al. 2013). It 
fails to find support among Eastern European groups. An important nuance is that Berman does 
not suggest social services cause groups to use violence, just that they help a group with 
mobilization, enabling more effective violence for those groups already engaged in violence. It is 
                                                 
13 Diaspora support is statistically significant and positively signed in two of the three of the 
robustness checks in the appendix. 
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likely that many groups delivering community services do not engage in violence, but other 
research suggests the few that do will be especially effective at it. It is also possible that the 
relationship is found in the Middle East because social service provision is more common among 
ethnopolitical groups there, as is violence. Overall, the possible connection between social 
service provision and ethnopolitical violence is worthy of future research, but it does not find 
support among Eastern European groups. 
 The control variables also show interesting results. The coefficient for Separatist is 
statistically insignificant. Religious, however, is statistically significant and positive in all 
models, suggesting that if a group has a religious motivation, it is more likely than an 
ethnopolitical group without religious motivation to use violence. This is consistent with the 
literature. 
 Regarding state-level control variables, both State regime type and State GDPPC (log) 
are statistically significant and positively signed. Regarding regime type, the positive sign 
suggests more authoritarian states are more likely to see violence by ethnopolitical groups. It is 
interesting that this variable is related to violence independently from the relationship involving 
repression. Apparently there are aspects of regime type other than repression, such as lack of 
political alternatives, which could drive subnational groups to violence. Future research should 
look beyond repression to disaggregate the relationship between various dimensions of regime 
type and violence.  
Regarding the positive relationship between violence and per capita wealth, this is 
unexpected, as research often finds poverty related to violence. This relationship is worth further 
examination, but it should be noted that the relationship between poverty and violence is for civil 
war, not all violence or specific types of violence such as terrorism. Some studies of terrorism 
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find country wealth associated positively with that type of violence (e.g., Piazza 2011). It is 
important for scholars of conflict to remember that while poverty is apparently related to civil 
war onset, that is only one type of violence. The current article is primarily focused on 
organizational dynamics of conflict, but scholars should continue to examine relationships 
between broader economic factors and violence.    
 Regarding time, year fixed effects are often statistically significant and negative in Model 
1, where the omitted year is 1988. This suggests groups are less likely to use violence in most 
years than in 1988. However, once state attributes are introduced in Model 2, most year variables 
are statistically insignificant. Apparently variation in state regime type and per capita income 
better explains violence than do particular years. A model in the online appendix includes a time 
trend variable, but it is statistically insignificant, suggesting there is not a general trend of 
increased or decreased likelihood of violence over time for ethnopolitical groups in Eastern 
Europe. It is negatively signed, but statistically insignificant.  
 Beyond the two models shown here, the results are generally robust to changes to model 
specification. In the online appendix, we include country fixed effects, and almost all the 
hypothesized results remain.14 Country fixed effects are helpful to take into consideration the 
myriad of country-level differences that could be associated with ethnonational violence. We do 
not include country fixed effects in all models, however, because about 25% of observations are 
                                                 
14 Indirect competition (groups in country), which is borderline statistically insignificant in 
Model 2, is insignificant in the country fixed effects model. Diaspora support also becomes 
statistically insignificant when country fixed effects are included. All other hypothesized 
relationships hold. Beyond hypothesized relationships, the regime type and per capita income 
measures lose statistical significance in these models. 
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dropped, substantially reducing the sample. This occurs because of the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable, and the fact that in some countries, none of the groups engage in violence. 
These countries drop from the sample with country fixed effects included, which means a 
systematic loss of observations because of the dependent variable value. Nonetheless, results are 
mostly robust in spite of the substantial sample change of country fixed effects models. 
 The appendix also includes a model with a measure of fuel export dependence (fuel 
exports as a percentage of exports), because resource curse can be an important source of 
grievances, ethnic or otherwise. The fuel dependence variable is statistically significant and 
positive, suggesting ethnopolitical groups in countries dependent on fuel exports are more likely 
to use violence. We do not include this variable in all models because it is missing data which 
causes a substantial number of observations to drop. Additionally, the focus of the article is on 
organizational attributes. However, most of the results shown in the main tables are robust in this 
model as well.15  
 Regarding substantive effects, marginal effects calculated from Model 2 suggest that 
Interorganizational competition and Territory are the variables associated with the greatest 
change in the probability for organizational violence. An Eastern European ethnopolitical group 
in competition with another such group is estimated to have a 11% greater likelihood of using 
violence than a group not in such competition, other factors held constant. The greatest effect is 
for groups holding territory, a 19% greater likelihood of using violence than groups not holding 
territory. It is difficult to be sure about causation with this variable, however, as groups holding 
                                                 
15 Territory loses statistical significance in the model with the resource curse control. However, 
this could be because the sample is substantially different due to missing data on the resource 
curse measure.  
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territory perhaps have already shown some capability or willingness to use violence. Future 
research should look into this association between ethnopolitical groups holding territory and 
their use of violence, because the association is substantively strong.  
Other hypothesized variables show substantial effects. Repression, Strong leader, 
Unpopular group, Foreign state support, and Diaspora support is each associated with a 4 to 6% 
increase in the likelihood of a group using violence. This magnitude of a change is relatively 
meaningful. For comparison, the control variable Religion is associated with a 6% increase in the 
likelihood of violence. Give the important role of religion in violence by subnational actors (e.g., 
Juergensmeyer 2003), it is noteworthy that other variables have a similar effect. 
 Taken together, the overall results shown in Table 3 suggest diverse types of factors – 
such as interorganizational and resource-related – are associated with the use of violence by 
Eastern European ethnopolitical groups. The result associated with repression suggests that 
government policies can have serious and counterproductive consequences. Interorganizational 
competition, perhaps underanalyzed in studies of political groups, and certainly in the literature 
on political violence, seems to play an extremely important role. The use of measures of two 
dimensions of competition, direct and indirect, allows us to test which type of competition could 
be especially associated with group violence. This adds nuance to our understanding of 
outbidding.  
Beyond competition, the organizational dynamics of leadership type and unpopularity of 
the group apparently have an important association with violence. Other factors, primarily 
holding territory, foreign state support, and receiving support from a diaspora, seem to relate 
directly to power or funding opportunities. Finally, the lack of relationship between social 
service provision and violence is surprising, and worth further investigation.  
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It is important to again acknowledge the regional limitations of our analysis. Like studies 
in the Middle East and other areas of the world, this study is dealing with a particular region that 
has traits that differentiate it in key ways from other regions (see for example Asal et al. 2013). 
This likely explains why the present research finds results that are different from those found by 
studies of other regions. In analysis of Middle Eastern ethnic organizations, there was no 
relationship between state regime type or group religiosity and violence (Asal et al. 2013), while 
we found autocracy and religious motivations related to violence. Additionally, the Middle 
Eastern study found social service provision related to violence, while we did not. Overall, this 
examination of Eastern European and Russian violent and nonviolent minority ethnopolitical 
organizations allows us to compare similar groups and to extend this analysis to a different 
region.  
Conclusion 
 Why do some ethnopolitical organizations engage in violence, while others choose non-
violent means to attempt to bring about political change? This question is important for both 
research on ethnic politics and the literature on political violence. In research on political 
violence in particular, studies tend to focus on the state as the unit of analysis, overlooking 
important organizational attributes. Studies of organizations and political violence almost always 
look at already-violent groups. To address the question of ethnopolitical violence in a fresh way, 
we emphasize the importance of organizational dynamics, and particularly the role of resources, 
and build an argument for which organizational attributes should matter in explaining violence. 
To test our argument, we focused on Eastern European ethnopolitical groups, an important and 
diverse sub-set of organizations. Most of these groups do not use violence. The results support 
some hypotheses from the literature, such as interorganizational competition and repression, 
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while failing to support some arguments such as a positive relationship between social service 
provision and violence.  
 The results complement and contrast with extant research in interesting ways. For 
example, some research suggests that competition among violent groups is associated with 
increased violence. Our study sheds light on interorganizational competition at an earlier stage in 
the process, finding that competition between groups is associated with a greater likelihood of a 
group using violence in the first place. This relationship appears when we measure competition 
directly (when a group has been observed to be in competition with another), as opposed to the 
proxy of the number of groups in the country. Similarly, the finding that repression of a group is 
associated with that group’s use of violence adds to the work on how state repression can affect 
subnational groups’ behavior. The apparent relationship between a group’s lack of popularity 
and its use of violence is also interesting, adding evidence to arguments that violence is 
sometimes a tool of last resort or a weapon of the weak. Regarding funding, in spite of the 
substantial literature on the economic roots of subnational violence, it is remarkable that the 
hypotheses about foreign state support and diaspora support were not as sustained by the 
empirical tests as other hypotheses. While there was some support for the idea of an association 
between these funding sources and violence, other factors seem to be much more important.  
It is noteworthy that social service provision is not associated with groups using violence. 
Berman argues that social services provide tools for helping violent groups to become much 
more violent. Why is there no relationship between social service provision and violence among 
Eastern Europe groups? More nuanced analysis of the relationship between social service 
provision and violence would contribute to our understanding of these phenomena. As noted 
above, there could be a multi-stage process, where organizations providing social services are no 
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more likely than other groups to engage in violence (the results of this study), but for the few 
social service groups that do engage in violence, they are especially effective at it (Berman’s 
results).        
 Future research can take a number of additional directions. First, because the study 
analyzed Eastern European groups, it is unclear how generalizeable the results are to other 
regions. Some results are consistent with those of studies of other regions, but global analyses 
and research on other regions and groups with other motivations will be fruitful. Related to this, 
there are a number of factors unique to this region that could play a role in organizational 
violence, but unfortunately we do not currently have data on all these factors. For example, 
groups in ethnofederalist states and autonomous regions have tools such as administrative 
resources that make successful secession more likely (Roeder 1991, 2009; Bunce 2004). Which 
of the groups in the data have access to administrative resources because of the structure of the 
state in which they operate, or the antecedent structure of that state? Additionally, this study 
found a relationship between holding territory and the use of violence, but holding territory 
occurs in many different ways. Does the location of the territory, relative to the capital or 
borders, matter? Further study of these dynamics would be interesting to explore.  
Second, when groups choose to engage in violence, why do some target civilians while 
others directly take on state security forces? Some studies have started to consider this question, 
generally in terms of terrorism vs. insurgency, but much remains to be explored. Along 
somewhat similar lines, this study sought to explain organizational violence generally, but do the 
same factors explain escalations to more serious or longer-term use of violence? The interstate 
war literature has looked at conflict as a process, with “steps to war,” but literature on 
subnational violence should take more seriously such dynamics (e.g., Moore 1998). Finally, the 
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results of this study suggest an important effect of inter-organizational competition or disputes. A 
handful of other studies have examined this type of intergroup behavior as it relates to political 
violence (e.g., Bloom 2005, Nemeth 2013), but we still know little about other consequences of 
competition between subnational political organizations (e.g., Phillips 2015), or why competition 
emerges in some contexts but not in others. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1. Countries with organizations included in data 
Albania 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovakia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Yugoslavia 
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Table 2. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Violence (DV) 2,588 .074 .262 0 1 
Interorganizational 
competition 
2,600 .069 .254 0 1 
Indirect competition 
(groups in country) 
2,633 17.089 12.305 1 41 
Repression 2,630 .293 .455 0 1 
Strong leader 2,633 .079 .270 0 1 
Unpopular organization 2,633 .193 .394 0 1 
Foreign state support 2,557 .084 .278 0 1 
Diaspora support 2,584 .028 .165 0 1 
Territory 2,633 .034 .182 0 1 
Social services 2,610 .107 .404 0 2 
Separatist 2,602 .548 .498 0 1 
Religious 2,625 .059 .236 0 1 
State regime type 2,564 1.933 .638 1 3 
State GDPPC (log) 2,448 8.700 .625 6.743 10.029 
State GDPPC growth 2,430 .418 3.627 -30.694 90.468 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
Table 3. Logistic regressions of violence by Eastern European ethnopolitical groups 
 Model 1 
Group attributes only 
Model 2 
With state attributes 
Interorganizational 3.290*** 3.450*** 
competition (.458) (.485) 
Indirect competition  .0643*** .0482* 
(groups in country) (.0239) (.0276) 
Repression 1.519*** 1.303*** 
 (.399) (.410) 
Strong leader 2.306*** 2.072*** 
 (.470) (.528) 
Unpopular group 1.024** 1.212*** 
 (.424) (.436) 
Foreign state support 1.091* 1.765*** 
 (.628) (.598) 
Diaspora support 1.699** 1.839** 
 (.845) (.823) 
Territory 5.397** 6.107** 
 (2.119) (2.778) 
Social services -1.593 -1.787 
 (.982) (1.301) 
Separatist .753 .676 
 (.642) (.596) 
Religious 2.204*** 1.948*** 
 (.620) (.617) 
State regime type  .700*** 
  (.222) 
State GDPPC (log)  1.369*** 
  (.408) 
State GDPPC growth  .006 
  (.018) 
Constant -5.753*** -19.59*** 
 (.948) (3.602) 
N 
(groups) 
2,384 
(261) 
2,231 
(251) 
Standard errors shown under coefficients, clustered by group. Year fixed effects included but not 
shown for space reasons. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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